VALERIE PLAME, JOE WILSON, AND YELLOW CAKE
TRUE? OR ASSERTION AND IMPUTATION?



CONTENTS

Summary points
Was Plame covert?
Was Joe Wilson's investigation credible?
Was the intelligence credible?
Fact:  Bush did not lie
Did Valerie Plame recommend Joe Wilson?
Never proven to be a crime
_____________________________________________________________________

A classic case of relying on non-facts, assertions, prejudiced perceptions and lack of reasoning.   Of course, those creating the story and having it perpetuate are the 'winners', but, I assert, the creators of a losing, harmful game.  Part of the harm is in perpetuating such games, so that people are focused on hatred instead of solutions and cooperation.

(As always, please provide any proof that would correct this.)

NO CRIME.  There is no proof that there was a crime committed.  (But they did get Libby on lying on the subject.)

NO LIE BY BUSH. In his address on Iraq he said what he believed was true and was told to him as fact.  FactCheck:  Bush's "16 Words" on Iraq & Uranium: He May Have Been Wrong But He Wasn't Lying.  The Senate intelligence committee report on pre-war Iraq intelligence concluded last week that “Wilson provided misleading information to the Washington Post last June.”  An independent committee of the British parliament found in September 2003 that the Iraqi/Nigerian yellowcake connection was “reasonable.”

NOT RESOLVED: PLAME COVERT.  "In his recently published memoirs, Novak wrote of Valerie Wilson, "She was not involved in clandestine activities. Instead, each day she went to CIA headquarters in Langley where she worked on arms proliferation."

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NEVER PROVEN WRONG:  Lots of country's had intelligence and sources deemed credible. 

JOE WILSON'S REPORT 'LIGHT' AND NOT STRONG.   The consensus expressed in the Senate report was that Wilson's trip provided little or no new information.  Wilson did a campaign of articles insisting he was right.  The administration had to deal with what they saw as untrue and hurting the factual case for what is right.  

PLAME SUED CHENEY ET AL WITH NO SUCCESS - If there was substance and provability it would seem that she could have won alot of money.  Of course, she could be right, but there is nothing to prove that.

CONCLUSION: NO BASIS FOR THE ASSERTIONS AROUND THIS.

In fact, the assertions that certain things, all against Bush, etc., are all based on nothing, so that they could belong to the category of 'preposterous', but unfortunately believed widely, with no basis.  People make up stories and 'facts' about this that are either taken from the 'party line' and/or the desire to make those people wrong. 

An open person would re-look at this and consider the facts and reasoning for what appears to me to be nonsense.


WAS PLAME COVERT?

QUESTION:  You said that Valerie Plame’s identity was classified but you’re making no statements as to whether she was covert.  Was the leaking her identity, of and in itself, a crime?

MR. FITZGERALD: . . . . [A]ll I’ll say is that if national defense information which is involved because her affiliation with the CIA, whether or not she was covert, was classified, if that was intentionally transmitted, that would violate the statute known as Section 793, which is the Espionage Act. That is a difficult statute to interpret. It’s a statute you want to carefully apply. There are lots of — I think there are people out there who would argue that you would never use that to prosecute the transmission of classified information because they think that would convert that statute into what is in England, the Official Secrets Act.

Before congress:

REP. TOM DAVIS (R), Virginia: I think what's missing -- and I think at least from a criminal perspective, not from a policy, but from a criminal perspective -- that the special prosecutor in this case looked at that and found that the people who may have been saying this didn't know that you were covert, and you don't have any evidence to the contrary.

VALERIE PLAME WILSON: That, I think, is a question better put to the special prosecutor, congressman.

Now, almost four years after the Bush Administration allegedly leaked her identity to news reporters in order to undermine the claims of her husband. Ambassador Joe Wilson. Plame still can't give a straight answer when asked if she was a covert agent under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act when this happened.


JOE WILSON'S REPORT QUALITY VS. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

Joe Wilson was not an expert investigator and he based his conclusion on "facts" that provided no proof, plus as assertions from government officials and it being probably too difficult to get the yellowcake out of the country of Nigeria.

Joe Wilson had taken a CIA-sponsored trip to Niger and found evidence that he said refuted President Bush's information on Iraq's nuclear weapons programs. Subsequently, he hawked this story at a forum sponsored by the Democratic Senate Policy Committee in May 2003 that Plame attended. The next day, he had a breakfast meeting with reporters from the New York Times and Washington Post about his speech that Plame said she was at as well. He later wrote a nationally published piece for the Times that said intelligence on weapons of mass destruction had been manipulated and got the United States to go to war with Iraq. A week a later, conservative journalist Robert Novak. in his July 14, 2003, column, wrote about Wilson's "findings" and mentioned that Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, was a CIA "operative on weapons of mass destruction."

In response to a request for an update, on 5 March 2002, a CIA WINPAC update noted that "the foreign government service that provided the original report 'was unable to provide new information, but continues to assess that its source is reliable.'" The update also noted that the CIA would be debriefing someone on 5 March 2002. That someone was Wilson. (43)

The debrief occurred in Wilson's home; the case officer wrote a draft intelligence report and "sent it to the DO reports officer who added additional relevant information from his notes." The report was graded "good" because it "responded to at least some of the outstanding questions in the Intelligence Community." (46)

A report based on Wilson's trip was widely disseminated via routine channels on 8 March 2002. (44)
This report indicated the the former Prime Minister of Niger was unaware of any Iraqi contracts for yellowcake, but acknowledged that in 1999 Iraq may have been interested in discussing yellowcake sales but the PM "steered the conversation away." Niger's former Minster for Energy said that there had been no yellowcake sales outside of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) channels since the 1980s.

This report also described "how the structure of Niger's uranium mines would make it difficult, if not impossible, for Niger to ell uranium to any rogue states."
The consensus expressed in the Senate report was that Wilson's trip provided little or no new information. Thus, the information was not used to "produce any further analytical products" and the CIA did not brief the Vice President on the report. (46)

On 20 November 2001, the Director General of Niger's French-led consortium said "there was no possibility" that Niger had diverted any of the 3,000 tons of yellowcake produced in its two uranium mines. (37)

A report based on Wilson's trip was widely disseminated via routine channels on 8 March 2002. (44)
This report indicated the the former Prime Minister of Niger was unaware of any Iraqi contracts for yellowcake, but acknowledged that in 1999 Iraq may have been interested in discussing yellowcake sales but the PM "steered the conversation away." Niger's former Minster for Energy said that there had been no yellowcake sales outside of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) channels since the 1980s.

This report also described "how the structure of Niger's uranium mines would make it difficult, if not impossible, for Niger to ell uranium to any rogue states."
The consensus expressed in the Senate report was that Wilson's trip provided little or no new information. Thus, the information was not used to "produce any further analytical products" and the CIA did not brief the Vice President on the report. (46)
http://uspolitics.about.com/od/wariniraq/a/niger.htm source senate iraq report.

Now, do you remember Joseph C. Wilson IV, the one-time CIA operative in Niger? He told the Washington Post that President Bush ignored his warning that it was “highly unlikely” that Iraq tried to buy yellowcake from Niger. Even though Wilson claims to be a “political centrist,” after the President’s speech he accused the White House of “misrepresenting the facts” while asking, “What else are they [the Bush team] lying about.” Official American, British, and French reports now seem to show that Wilson was the one lying.

The Senate intelligence committee report on pre-war Iraq intelligence concluded last week that “Wilson provided misleading information to the Washington Post last June.”

An independent committee of the British parliament found in September 2003 that the Iraqi/Nigerian yellowcake connection was “reasonable.”

Lord Butler’s report, delivered today to the UK’s House of Commons, found that evidence uncovered by British Intelligence of Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from Niger was credible and based on “several different sources.”

French intelligence has also given account of Iraqi attempts to buy Nigerian yellowcake. But that’s not all the evidence now piled up against Wilson.

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1171429/posts


THE INTELLIGENCE

There is no explanation why the CIA reported on 25 March 2002 from the same [foreign] government service, which said "the 2000 agreement by Niger to provide uranium to Iraq specified that 500 tons of uranium per year would be delivered in --redacted--." In other words, the report is now asserting "as fact" that there was a contract. What caused the CIA to determine that the information was now "firm"?

The source for this asssertion remains the unnamed foreign government service - which did not provide the DO with information about the source or how the intelligence was collected.

On 11 September 2002, the National Security Council (NSC) contacted the CIA to clear language for possible use in a statement by the president. The language cleared by the CIA: (49)
"Iraq has made several attempts to buy high strength aluminum tubes used in centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. And we know this: within the past few years, Iraq has resumed efforts to obtain large quantities of a type of uranium oxide known as yellowcake, which is an essential ingredient in this process. The regime was caught trying to purchase up to 500 metric tons of this material. It takes about 10 tons to produce enough enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon."

On 24 September 2002, the British issued a white paper which stated: "[T]there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa." (50)

Concurrent with the British report, NSC contacted the CIA to have another statement cleared. The cleared statement:
"We also have intelligence that Iraq has sought large amounts of uranium and uranium oxide, known as yellowcake, from Africa. Yellowcake is an essential ingredient in the process to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons."

On 24 September 2002, the British issued a white paper which stated: "[T]there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa." (50)   (http://uspolitics.about.com/od/wariniraq/a/niger_3.htm)


BUSH DID NOT LIE; THE INFORMATION WAS CREDIBLE

Bush's "16 Words" on Iraq & Uranium: He May Have Been Wrong But He Wasn't Lying
July 26, 2004
Updated: August 23, 2004

Two intelligence investigations show Bush had plenty of reason to believe what he said in his 2003 State of the Union Address.

Summary

The famous “16 words” in President Bush’s Jan. 28, 2003 State of the Union address turn out to have a basis in fact after all, according to two recently released investigations in the US and Britain.

Bush said then, “The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa .” Some of his critics called that a lie, but the new evidence shows Bush had reason to say what he did.

A British intelligence review released July 14 calls Bush’s 16 words “well founded.”
A separate report by the US Senate Intelligence Committee said July 7 that the US also had similar information from “a number of intelligence reports,” a fact that was classified at the time Bush spoke.

Ironically, former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who later called Bush’s 16 words a “lie”, supplied information that the Central Intelligence Agency took as confirmation that Iraq may indeed have been seeking uranium from Niger.

Both the US and British investigations make clear that some forged Italian documents, exposed as fakes soon after Bush spoke, were not the basis for the British intelligence Bush cited, or the CIA's conclusion that Iraq was trying to get uranium.

None of the new information suggests Iraq ever nailed down a deal to buy uranium, and the Senate report makes clear that  US intelligence analysts have come to doubt whether  Iraq was even trying to buy the stuff. In fact, both the White House and the CIA long ago conceded that the 16 words shouldn’t have been part of Bush’s speech.

But what he said – that Iraq sought uranium – is just what both British and US intelligence were telling him at the time. So Bush may indeed have been misinformed, but that's not the same as lying.






DID VALERIE PLAME RECOMMEND JOE WILSON?

Largely irrelevant, but this was a matter of contention whether she instigated husband being hired:

A memo from Plame to the head of the CPD on 12 February 2002 said her "husband has good relations" with the prime minister and minister of mines. If the information is in the Senate report (naming names), it has been redacted.


On 19 February, Wilson met with the CPD to discuss "the merits of the former ambassador travelling to Niger." The meeting included analysts from the CIA and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). Plame attended the meeting only to introduce Wilson.

Before congress:

Nevertheless, we went to my branch chief, our supervisor. My colleague suggested this idea. And my supervisor turned to me and said, "Well, when you go home this evening, would you be willing to speak to your husband, ask him to come into headquarters next week, and we'll discuss the options, see what we could do?" "Of course."

REP. TOM DAVIS (R), Virginia: I think what's missing -- and I think at least from a criminal perspective, not from a policy, but from a criminal perspective -- that the special prosecutor in this case looked at that and found that the people who may have been saying this didn't know that you were covert, and you don't have any evidence to the contrary.

VALERIE PLAME WILSON: That, I think, is a question better put to the special prosecutor, congressman.


WAS IT A CRIME?

Did they in fact know that she was a covert agent?  Did they intend any harm? (An "unknowable" at this point.)  Why was it never proven to be a crime?  And what would the crime be if it were a crime?

There is no evidence a crime was committed.

Patrick Fitzgerald decided that he could not prove in court--as he would have to under the law--that the leakers knew that Valerie Wilson was a covert officer.

UPDATE II:  Just to underscore a bit further the total lack of clarity surrounding the Espionage Act — and the deep confusion on the part of those (like Carroll) who believe that publishing classified information is a crime, let alone clearly a crime — consider what Patrick Fitzgerald said in his October, 2005, Press Conference, when explaining why he did not seek an indictment against the Bush officials who leaked classified information to the media:  i.e., that Valerie Plame worked for the CIA (h/t PowWow):


BRIT HUME: And the other thing that needs to be noted here is when she says that she had nothing to do with getting her husband the trip, that flies in the face of the evidence adduced by the Senate Intelligence Committee whose findings were released not on a partisan basis — the bipartisan findings of the Senate Intelligence Committee, which was that she very much did have something to do with it, that she recommended him and that she put it in a memo.

But no, says Victoria Toensing, Valerie Plame was not really “covert.” Not according to The Intelligence Identities Protection Act which, Ms. Toensing wants us all to know, she helped draft a couple of decades ago. Toensing contends that Plame qualified as “covert” according to all provisions of the Act save one, which stipulates that a covert agent is one “... who resides and acts outside the United States as an agent [etc]...”  This is Toensing’s “gotcha!”  Plame, she says, did not “reside” outside the US in the required past five years, so she was not, says Toensing, “covert within the meaning of the statute, which I am an expert on because I helped draft it.”  Never mind that Plame was employed by a CIA front organization, that she engaged in top secret intelligence gathering, that the information so gathered was essential to the national security of the United States, that her very life and that of her operatives abroad depended on the non-disclosure of her CIA association. And finally, no matter that the CIA Director explicitly identified Plame’s activity as “covert.” Never mind all that. Victoria Toensing points out that Plame did not reside outside the United States, as the law requires.